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NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON* 
This Introduction notes the emerging mandate for znternakbnal envi- 
ronmental law and !he concurrent problems of implementatrbn. It fo- 
m e s  on two particular applications of this new mandale: the Ohlied 
Stales-Panama Joini! Envzionment Commission for the Panama Canal, 
and the sz~ggested role of the Unded Natlbns Environment Programme 
in developing a system of global enutionmental hazard alerts. 
This issue of the .YtanfordJournal oflnternational Law could hardly 
be more timely. The international community is at the threshold of 
formulating new roles for international law in protecting the Earth's 
environment. Long recognized as a vehicle for ordering behavior 
among states and within societies, law is now perceived as ordering 
the relationships between human endeavors and the environment 
which sustains them. 
Since the late 1960s, there has been a n  extraordinary expansion 
of laws for environmental protection on both the national' and inter- 
national planes.' These laws mirror evolving social values; their very 
existence evidences a growing "reconciliation," as the eminent Eng- 
lish scientist Lord Eric Ashby expresses it, "of man with the environ- 
ment."3 
Yet the initial framework of environmental law is necessarily lim- 
ited. Data enabling scientists to understand many environmental 
problems is lacking. Even when problems are understood, percep- 
tions vary as to wh.at steps will solve them. These fundamental 
B.A. 1967, Brown University; J.D. 1970, Columbia University. Associate Professor of 
Law, Pace University. 
1 Ser, c.g., J. NOBLE, J. BANTA & J. ROSENBERC, GROPING THROUGH THE MALE 
(1977); R. ODELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AWAKENING (1980). 
2 &c, rg., the essays in the three volumes in print of the Earth Law Joumaf (1975-77); or 
those in the journal of the llnternational Council of Environmental Law, Enuironmcntaf Policy 
and Law (1975-81). 
E. ASHBY, RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT 86 (1978). 
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problems are all the more acute at the transnational level where ac- 
cepted legal norms have not fully evolved. In his Leon Sloss, Jr., 
Memorial Lectures at Stanford University in 1977, Lord Ashby care- 
fully delineated these problems and the reconciliation of organized 
human development with the capacity of nature to sustain it. This 
reconciliation means the recognition that society must understand, 
nurture, and maintain functioning natural systems, not disregard or 
exploit them as if humankind were somehow independent of n a t ~ r e . ~  
This Introduction is an overview of the recent attempts within the 
international legal system to bring about that reconciliation. 
Every ideology recognizes stewardship of natural resources and 
the protection of natural systems as a basic obligation of govern- 
ment.5 The question is not so much whether the obligation exists, 
but what importance to assign to the duty and how to discharge it. 
Many states still treat environmental protection as a low priority, 
either because they lack the technical capacity to foresee the long 
term loss which adverse environmental activities bring-as in the ex- 
panding desertification of the Sahel-or because they value only the 
short term gains of industrial production-as in the pell-mell factory 
development which until recently characterized Brazil and the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. 
Ideological differences, therefore, may be less difficult to over- 
come than the prevailing attitude among many leaders that environ- 
mental protection is not yet important. Most government officials 
never studied problems of biosphere protection in school; few have 
encountered environmental issues in their careers. 
The community of nations, however, recognized the growing 
threat of pollution to life and productivity at the 1972 United Na- 
tions Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden. 
The resulting U.N. Declaration on the Human Environment is a 
compendium of policies favoring sound environmental ~tewardship.~ 
Nonetheless, a gap remains between intellectual appreciation of the 
problem and creation of governmental programs to deal with it. 
4 Sce generaI/r E. ASHBY, supra note 3. 
5 Compare National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 55 4321-4361 (1976) 
with KONSTITUSIIA (Constitution) art. 42 (U.S.S.R.) ("Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right 
to health protection. The right is ensured . . . by measures to improve the environment.") 
" Src Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. I ~ ' L  
L.J. 423 (1973). 
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Recently, however, two influential new authorities have reissued 
the call for national and international action to avert global environ- 
mental injury. The first is the 1980 report of the Independent Com- 
mission on International Development Issues, chaired by former 
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, entitled North-South: A Pro- 
gram for Surviuaf.' The second is a three-volume monograph pro- 
duced by the United States government for former President Jimmy 
Carter, entitled The Gh~6aC 2000 Report to the President .' 
Concluding the M~rt/l-South study, former German Chancellor 
Brandt and seventeen other world leaders declared that all nations 
must cooperate more urgently in international management of the 
atmosphere and other global commons, and in the prevention of irre- 
versible ecological d a ~ ~ a g e . ~  
The Brandt Comm.ision findings anticipated by just half a year 
the similar conclusions of the United States agencies'' working on 
the Global 2000 Report. This report projected the results of present 
trends in population, resources, and the environment if continued 
without change to the end of the century. While much more detailed 
than the Brandt Commixsion Report, its conclusions are comparable. 
As the world's population increases by 55 percent over the next 
.two decades, current tirends point to substantial increases in air and 
water pollution, loss of forests and agricultural resources, reduction of 
soil productivity, extinction of many plant and animal species, and 
impairment of health conditions. In transmitting the report to Presi- 
dent Carter, Gus Speth, Chairman of the President's Council on 
Evironmental Quality, and Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary of 
State, observed that "the trends reflected in the Global 2000 study 
suggest strongly a prc~gressive degradation and impoverishment of 
7 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, NORTH- 
SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL (1980) [hereinafter cited as BRANDT COMMISSION 
REPORT]. 
8 COUNCIL ON ENVIRO~IMENTAL QUALITY & U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as GLOBAL 2000 REPORT]. 
9 BRANDT COMMISSION REPORT, sups note 7, at 117 ("The strain on the global envi- 
ronment derives mainly from the growth of industrial economies, but also from that of the 
world's population. It threatens the survival and development opportunities of future genera- 
tions. All nations have to coc~perate more urgently in international management of the at- 
mosphere and other global commons, and in the prevention of irreversible ecological 
damage.''). 
10 The agencies are: Department of Energy; National Science Foundation; Environ- 
mental Protection Agency; Department of Agriculture; Department of Interior; Department 
of Commerce; National Aeron~autics and Space Administration; Department of State; Office 
of Science and Technology Policy in Executive Office of President; Federal Emergency Man- 
agement Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and President's Council on Environmental 
Quality. 
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the earth's natural resource base."" There are, moreover, many im- 
plications for national and international environmental law in the 
Global 2000 study, which transcend the current policies or priorities 
within any single country.I2 
The Global 2000 Report also examined earlier studies of the global 
environment, reviewing the works of the Club of RomeI3 and the 
model of Mihajlo Mesarovic and Edward P e ~ t e l . ' ~ * I ~  Although the 
works of these commentators differ in degree and emphasis, their 
conclusions are inescapable: Governments locally, nationally, and 
globally must develop effective new policies, programs, and laws to 
avert environmental degradation. 
On January 14, 1981, representatives of the Council on Environ- 
mental Quality and the Department of State released a six-month 
study of recommendations for federal action to reverse the deleteri- 
ous trends described in the Global 2000 Report. ' T h e s e  recommenda- 
tions, admittedly tentative," fell into three groups. First, since the 
Global 2000 Report documented the present inability of federal agen- 
cies to anticipate and evaluate global problems, the recommenda- 
tions proposed a centralized authority to gather and assess 
information and foster development of an integrated U.S. strategy on 
resources, environment, and population. Second, remedial policies 
were sketched to cope with population growth, food production, re- 
newable energy resources, tropical forests, maintenance of biological 
diversity, coastal and marine resource protection, water and air qual- 
ity, and the problem of nuclear and other hazardous wastes. Finally, 
the study proposed institutional changes to assure that these policies 
could be implemented.18 
Another recent consensus of scientific and managerial policies is 
embodied in the World Commation Strategy of the International Union 
1 '  I GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 8, at i i i .  
'2 Set general4 I GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, +a note 8; 2 id at 227-452. 
13 D.L. MEADOWS, D.H. MEADOWS, E. ZAHN, P. MILLING, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH 
(1972). 
l 4  M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974). 
I 5  2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 8, at 601-55. One early survey which is still 
useful is the anthology of reports compiled by the American Society of International Law. 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAW, INSTITUTIONS & THE GLOBAL ENVI- 
RONMENT (1972). The more traditional legal and political approaches for transnational-envi- 
ronmental protection have been ably synthesized by Jan Schneider. J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD 
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL E C O ~ I C A L  LAW 
AND ORC;ANIZATION (1979). 
16 COLINCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GLOBAL FUTURE: 
TIME TO A m  (1981) [hereinafter cited as GLOBAL FUTURE]. 
17 Id at xix. 
18 Id at xxv-liii. 
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for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN).I9 
Still earlier, in 1975, several hundred scientists independently framed 
a range of proposals S3r protection of natural systems at the EARTH- 
CARE ~onference.~' 
. There is no dearth, therefore, of informed policies awaiting adop- 
tion. What is lacking, as Jan Schneider points out, is the political 
will to embrace those: reforms.21 
This essay introduces a volume which includes many illustrations 
of the role international law may play in assuring a stable world or- 
der capable of maintaaining Earth's environmental quality. 
The best hope for environmental preservation is embodied in the 
Barcelona Agreement, in which the coastal Mediterranean states 
agreed to cooperate in combatting a shared environmental problem 
- pollution of the Mlediterranean Sea. Ms. Patricia Bliss-Guest's ar- 
ticle on the Land-Based Sources Protocol to the Barcelona Conven- 
tion describes the continuing cooperation of these states. The 
Agreement and Protocols address a specific environmental hazard. 
At the same time, they demonstrate the ability of regions with diverse 
national governments to agree on strategies to combat a shared prob- 
lem in spite of political differences. The pattern established in the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Mediterranean 
agreements may prove equally helpful in other regions facing compa- 
rable ecological dangers. 
The focus of environmental concern and protection efforts has, 
for some time, rested. with the industrialized nations of the West. 
The article by Messrs. H. Jeffrey Leonard and David Morell offers a 
new view. Developing nations will encounter similar ecological 
problems as a result of economic growth. Environmental degrada- 
tion has already occurred in some developing nations that encourage 
production by multinational industries. Effective response to future 
environmental dangers will depend on the establishment of effective 
l 9  INTERNAT~ONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVAT~ON OF NATURE AND NATURAL RE- 
SOURCES, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCES CONSERVATION FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1980). The IUCN is a unique international agency with state 
members, agency members @g., the U.S. .Forest Service), and nongovernmental members 
(c.g., the Sierra Club and the All Russia Society for the Protection of Nature). 
20 EARTHCARE: GLOBAL PROTECTION OF NATURAL AREAS (E. Schofield ed. 1978). 
The book consists of papers written for the 14th Biennial Wilderness Conference (June 5-8, 
1975). 
21 J. SCHNEIDER, mpra note 15, at 199. 
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political institutions with sufficient expertise to assess the extent and 
impact of pollution sources. Environmentalism can no longer be-if 
indeed it ever has been-the exclusive province of industrialized 
states. 
Environmental problems are more easily handled if they are ad- 
dressed at an early stage. In this regard, two articles in this issue of 
the Journal are particularly useful. The first, Dr. Edith Brown 
Weiss' examination of the implications of new developments in the 
technology of weather forecasting, points to the danger that a few 
nations, possessed of such knowledge, could exploit weather fluctua- 
tions for their own economic or political benefit. The critical link 
between weather patterns and resource use increases the importance 
of forecasting technology in a period of diminishing resources. Ms. 
Allene Zanger's note on the threat posed by increasing levels of car- 
bon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere describes another feature of 
global climate with severe environmental implications. Both articles 
present useful and reasonable strategies to address the described 
problems before a critical threat to the environment arises. The suc- 
cess of the recent Mediterranean negotiations, moreover, indicates 
that multilateral planning for environmental protection can succeed 
much in the manner that the authors propose. 
In total, this issue of the StanjrdJournal of International Law 
presents both a realistic and an optimistic view of international envi- 
ronmental law. Continued progress in protecting and restoring the 
international environment must result from cooperative efforts 
among nations. In the industrialized West, and in the developing 
world, we see that these efforts are underway. 
111. ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROGRESSIVE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Beside the developments described in the articles that follow, 
there are two further noteworthy illustrations of global developments 
in environmental protection: (i) the Panama-United States initia- 
tive to create a Joint Environmental Commission to deal with threats 
to the Central and North American environment; and (ii) the au- 
thority of the Executive Director of UNEP to issue international 
alerts concerning threats to the global environment. While these in- 
novative measures have remained dormant, they are examples of the 
new governmental roles needed at the regional and global levels. 
Only by developing these roles can the environmental protection 
mandate be realized. 
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A. BilaCta/ U~dertakings by Panama and the UnitGd States 
The Panama Canal Treaty illustrates how two non-continguous 
nations can agree to collaborate to protect a shared environment. 
During the public delbates on the Treaty in 1977, only a handful .of 
persons were even aware of the environmental issues surrounding the 
Treaty.22 Yet, despitt: the public's lack of perception of the need to 
protect the Panama Canal watershed, the ultimate series of bilateral 
undertakings broke new international environmental protection 
ground. 
The Panama Canal agreements established the first joint environ- 
mental commission the United States has entered into with another 
nation not contiguous to one of the fifty states.23 How this came 
about, without even public demand or political machination by ei- 
ther government, is worth recounting in this introduction. 
1. History of the l7eaty. 
The 1903 Panama Canal Treaty, by which the United States 
finished construction of the Canal, provided that the United States 
would control the area as "if it were the ~overeign."~~ The United 
States entered into f~~r ther  agreements in 1936 and 1955 regarding 
control of the Canal Zone.25 President Lyndon B. Johnson initiated 
negotiations for a new Panama Canal Treaty in 1964 following anti- 
United States riots in the Canal Zone. The riots reflected resentment 
against U.S. control of 550 square miles of key Panamanian 
22 These included: those responsible for maintaining the Canal's navigation capacity; 
Panama's natural resource rrtanagement agency, RENARE; scientific institutes such as the 
Smithsonian Institution; environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and World Wildlife 
Fund; and the small cadre of diplomats from Panama and the United States assigned to work 
on environmental issues (such as the Office of International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs in the U.S. State Department). 
23 The United States h a  joint commissions on border environmental issues with Ca- 
nada, Water Boundary Treaty of 1909, United States-Canada, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548; 
and with Mexico, Agreement on Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, United States- 
Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708. The United States is also part of a cooperative 
body which oversees the envilronmental agreement with the Soviet Union. Agreement of Co- 
operation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23, 1972, US.-U.S.S.R. 23 U.S.T. 
845, T.I.A.S. No. 7345. However, this cooperative body has no authority for independent 
action. 
24 Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama, an .  111, 33 Stat. 
2234, T.S. No. 43 1. 
25 Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, United States-Pan- 
ama, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297; Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936, 
United States-Panama, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945. 
26 Why a New Panama Canal Treaty?, Address by Sol M. Linowitz, in Denver, Colo- 
rado (Aug. 19, 1977), at 3 (print of speech available from Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of 
Media Services, Department of State). 
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Two treaties, plus a series of collateral agreements, comprise the 
ultimate package of the new Panama Canal arrangements: the Pan- 
ama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neu- 
trality and Operation of the Panama The Panama Canal 
Treaty presents the largest number of environmental law issues. 
2 .  Environmental Components of the T r e a ~ .  
The environmental components of the Treaty are substantial. 
For the first time an essentially non-environmental treaty created a 
Joint Commission on the Environment. The extension of bilateral 
environmental diplomacy into a primarily political and security con- 
text is a valuable precedent. It is a sound acknowledgement that 
sensitive environmental issues exist in Panama and that the unique 
history of U.S.-Panama relations provides cause for specially created 
channels for coping with those issues. Article VI of the Treaty pro- 
vides the duties and structure for the Joint Commission. The enu- 
merated duties of the Commission include mutual consultation on 
actions with potentially adverse environmental impact and the pres- 
entation of recommendations to avoid damage.28 
Although incorporation into the Treaty of duties to exchange in- 
formation and consult on environmental protection issues is a major 
step forward, the absence of other basic environmental protection 
measures reflects a number of inadequacies in the Treaty. For exam- 
ple, the Treaty is silent on such important issues as the control of 
27 Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, - U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. 
No. -, rcprinfcd in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1021 (1977) (includes Annex); Treaty Con- 
cerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, September 7, 1977, 
United States-Panama, - U.S.T. A, T.I.A.S. No. -, rcprintcdin i d  at 1040. 
28 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 27, art. VI: 
"1. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama commit themselves to im- 
plement this Treaty in a manner consistent with the protection of the natural environment of 
the Republic of Panama. To this end, they shall consult and cooperate with each other in all 
appropriate ways to ensure that they shall give due regard to the protection and conservation 
of the environment. 
"2. A Joint Commission on the Environment shall be established with equal representation 
from the United States of America and the Republic of Panama, which shall periodically 
review the implementation of this Treaty and shall recommend as appropriate to the two 
Governments ways to avoid or, should this not be possible, to mitigate the adverse environ- 
mental impacts which might result from their respective actions pursuant to the Treaty. 
"3. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall furnish the Joint Com- 
mission on the Environment complete information on any action taken in accordance with 
the Treaty which, in the judgment of both, might have a significant effect on the environ- 
ment. Such information shall be made available to the Commission as far in advance of the 
contemplated action as possible to facilitate the study by the Commission of any potential 
environmental problems and to allow for consideration of the recommendation of the Com- 
mission before the contemplated action is carried out." 
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Aj?osa (hoof and mouth disease).29 Furthermore, the text itself raises 
a number of questions as to scope and construction. 
First, the Joint Co~mmission and bilateral national agreements fo- 
cus on protecting the environment of Panama. Activities in Panama 
can, however, affect the environment of the United States, and other 
countries as well as the ecology of two oceans. Thus, it may be in- 
ferred that the necessary scope of protection is broader than just the 
Panamanian environment . 
Second, a range of environmental matters are left open as to 
whether'the United States or Panama will assume responsibility for 
them. These include, among others, prevention of the spillage of oil 
and other harmful sub~tances ,~  the dredging of the Canal,31 and pu- 
rification and supply (of water.32 
Finally, present en~vironmental problems will be affected by the 
transfer of authority. :Problems within this category include exploita- 
tion of the tropical rain forest and regulation of water pollution from 
sources other than oil spills. 
The Joint Commission, it is hoped, will be able to meet these 
problems as they arise. The Commission is not expressly limited to 
Canal issues; thus, the:oretically, it should be able to deal with such 
diverse issues as the Darien Gap highway or exploitation of the tropi- 
cal rain forest. 
3. Stnuturc of the Jrotjrf Commission . 
On January 6, 1978, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christo- 
pher issued a Statement on the Panama Canal Treaties and Environ- 
mental P r ~ t e c t i o n , ~ ~  in which he noted the importance of the 
Panamanian environments and the enthusiastic commitments of 
29 The barriers of the Carnal waterway and of the tropical rain forests of the Darien Gap 
in Panama have prevented the northern expansion of Aftosa, "foot and mouth disease", in 
livestock. While this disease has been held in check in the United States, it is prevalent in 
South America. &c Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63,65 (D.D.C. 1975) (environmen- 
tal impact statement held insufficient in its consideration of the control of hoof and mouth 
disease). &c gcncra/b Tarlock, 7 % ~  Appluatim of & Nafrbna/ Erwi-&I Pof'cy Art of /969 to 
Ulc aon'm Cop Hkrlwy h j c c t ,  7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 459 (1974). 
30 Annex to Panama Canal Treaty, mpm note 27, para. 3(n). 
31 Id at para. 3(s). 
32 Id at para. 3(x). 
33 Statement on the Parlama Canal Treaties and Environmental Problems Uan. 12, 
1978) (distributed with cover lettvs by William H. Mansfield 111, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Office of Environmental Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State) @kwfrb/b r c p " h f  in SIERRA CLUB BULLETIN, April 1978, at 24-25) [hereinafter 
cited as Christopher text]. 
34 Id at para. 1. 
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both the United States35 and'Panama36 toward making the Joint 
Commission on the Environment effective. 
The most interesting portion of the statement is Christopher's 
view on how the Joint Commission will be struct~red.~'  But, it is 
likely that this structure will require new legislation to be fully imple- 
mented. The House of Representatives-which has not yet had as 
prominent a role to play with respect to the Treaties as it would 
like-will probably seize such opportunities to define U.S. proce- 
dures under the Treaty. 
Whether the State Department proceeds to structure the Com- 
mission or Congress exercises authority to do so, there are three possi- 
ble models for the Joint Commission. There is, first, the bilateral 
cooperation agreement format such as the environmental agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.38 This format en- 
tails an exchange of information and experts and occasional joint 
projects to study problems of mutual interest. The second is the pat- 
tern of the International Boundary and Water Commis~ion,~~ which 
focuses on environmental issues of boundary water volume and qual- 
ity for the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. The third model is the 
International Joint Commission between the United States and Ca- 
nada (I.J.C.), with an open-ended agenda and a flexible, evolving 
35 I,! at para. 3 ("For the United States, this [commitment] will entail provision of rele- 
vant information about the Canal Zone ahd its resources, technical assistance, as well as 
resources needed to carry out effective programs of environmental protection. To  that end, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development is developing a project, in cooperation with 
the Panamanian Government, to provide it with the capability to carry out sound land and 
water management and restoration programs.") 
36 Id at para. 4 ("On the Panamanian side, our diplomatic mission in Panama has 
noted that the Panamanian Government is taking environmental concerns seriously and has 
attached a high priority to the problem of protecting the Canal watershed. As evidence of 
this, the mission reports that both the Panamanian Minister of Planning and the Vice Minis- 
ter of Agriculture have recently pressed for early implementation of the AID Watershed 
Management Project .") 
37 I,! at para. 5 ("It is our intention that the Joint Environmental Commission shall 
have the staff and financial support it needs to be effective. We will propose that the Ameri- 
can members of this Commission include leading science and environmental figures as well as 
others from the private and public sectors. In addition, reports on the state of the environ- 
ment in the Canal Zone and the surrounding watershed will be assembled and indexed. Fed- 
eral agencies with expertise relevant to Canal Zone issues will assist in developing information 
for the Joint Commission on matters which require priority attention. And, recognizing the 
importance of baseline data showing the current state of Canal Zone ecosystems, including 
air and water quality, marine life in the adjacent oceans, and Aora and fauna, the U.S. will 
cooperate with the Panamanian Government in assembling that data expeditiously.") 
38 Agreement of Cooperation In the Field of Environmental Protection, supra note 23. 
39 International Boundary and Water Commission Act, 22 U.S.C. 88 277-277f (1976 & 
Supp. 1980). 
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authority for coordinated work on environmental protection issues.* 
The last two coinmissions were designed before environmental 
concerns became prominent. Both have taken on environmental is- 
sues and procedures in recent years.41 They have powers to gather 
information (including subpoena powers), to exchange information, 
to maintain field ofltices, to place matters on the common agenda, 
.and to require their examination. Experts, on staff or secured "on 
loan" from other agencies, assist these commissions and expert advi- 
sory committees to :undertake oversight and follow-up responsibili- 
ties. As a result, the referral of a specific matter to the U.S.- 
Canadian Joint Coinmission has proven significant in prompting 
amelioration of environmental problems. The U.S.-Canadian Joint 
Commission also has, regulatory power to license "uses, diversions, or 
obstructions" affecting the flow or bend of boundary waters4' 
Regardless of the model chosen, the Commission also must estab- 
lish procedures detailing how its obligations will be undertaken. The 
Panama Canal Treaty directs the U.S.-Panama Joint Commission to 
oversee protection of the environment through the fulfillment of a 
series of mandatory duties. It requires that the Commission "shall" 
review treaty implenlentation and "shall recommend" ways to avoid 
or mitigate environmental harm. It also provides that both parties 
"shall" furnish complete information on actions, but only when both 
agree that the actions may have a significant effect on the environ- 
ment.43 The veto potential of this provision must be circumscribed by 
mutually agreed upon standards. The test created by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which defines an action's "signif- 
i ~ a n c e " , ~ ~  could be grafted onto this clause; in fact, since NEPA in- 
spired this Treaty language, such an interpretation is entirely 
appropriate. 
Other procedures must also be explored. For instance, within 
Panama the Commission should develop ways to refer environmental 
matters to local heallth and conservation officers. Provisions should 
be designed for training in and programs for collection of base-line 
* Water Boundary Treaty of 1909, suprn note 23; Exec. Order No. 9972, 13 Fed. Reg. 
3573 (1948) (under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. 5 288 (1945)). 
41 Note, The InfmtiomilJoinf Commission (United S f a f c s - C d )  and the I n f m a f i o m l  Bound- 
a y  and Wafer Commlrsion (Urnfed Sfafcs-Mexico): Poftnfial for Enuironmental Control Along h e  
B o d n i s ,  6 N.Y.U.J. INT'I. L. & POL. 499, 501, 503 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Inftmafioml 
Joint Commljsion 1. 
42 Water Boundary Treaty of 1909, supra note 23, art. 111. 
43 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 27, art. VI. 
44 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 5 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2)(c) 
(1976). 
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data and other information on an outgoing basis. Procedures should 
be created to enable the citizens of other countries, or scientific and 
environmental groups, to bring matters to the Commission's atten- 
tion. 
' Most important in this regard will be the relationship of the Joint 
Environment Commission to the Panama Canal Commission. If en- 
vironmental protection is to be taken seriously, this relationship must 
be defined at the outset with clarity. Congress has had more experi- 
ence in framing such a relationship than has the State Department, 
although the State Department could also seek guidance from the 
Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of the Interior, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Finally, priorities for the Commission's initial environmental 
agenda should be announced. The Joint Commission should begin 
operations with several clear and immediate charges, such as a joint 
program to contain A&oa south of the Darien peninsula before Co- 
lombia extends the Pan American highway into and for- 
estry management to avoid soil erosion and protect flora and fauna, 
especially endangered species. 
Setting aside the Joint Commission's preparation of its operating 
procedures and its substantive agenda, ratification of the Panama 
Canal Treaty has brought already to environmental law the under- 
taking of two non-neighboring states to act in concert to protect the 
regional environment. This model could be replicated in other re- 
gions. NEPA and the Canadian and Mexican Boundary Commis- 
sions are the best guides available in this process. Beyond protection 
of the Central American environment, the innovations may serve as a 
model for other nations. As a major project, the Canal may have 
been unique in its creation, but, in hindsight, it is actually a percur- 
sor of like projects around the world. 
4.  Sfow Treaty Impfmmlotton. 
Sound treaty language never ensures a treaty's success; the true 
test is implementation. While assessment now may be premature, 
cleary the realization of the Treaty's early potential has been slow. 
The U.S. members of the Joint Commission were recently ap- 
pointed and an initial set of meetings took p l a ~ e . ~  But even with 
45 Colombians Are Glaring Girp in Pm Amm'can Hi~qAwry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1980, at 2, 
col. 3. 
&e Heanirgs on Pmama Cimol Treap &fie the Pmrmno Gmal Subcommittee dthe Hmrsc 
Mmchod Man& mdF'Aniu &vn, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979-80) (statement of Deputy h ' t  
Stc'y of State for Environment, Health, and Natural Resources William A. Haync). 
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members appointed i~nd  a small staff in place, most basic issues of 
implementation remarin to be addressed. These include the vital is- 
sues of securing access to information necessary for the Commission 
to function and of consultation procedures with other nations. 
Yet while the Commission founders in a morass of bureaucratic 
detail, two forces are working to degrade the Panamanian environ- 
ment. The first is deforestation of the Canal Zone through slash-and- 
burn farming techniclues which threaten the watershed which sup- 
plies the Canal.*' The second environmental hazard, which affects 
not only Panama but all of Central and North America, is the break- 
down of the epidemiological barriers of the Canal Zone. With the 
shrinking of the tropical forests, there is greater danger of the spread 
of yellow fever, malaria, aJloa, and other diseases northward. If 
these diseases are not contained in Panama, they can even spread 
throughout the world via the passage of ships through the 
Since Panamian government agencies lack the staff and the fund- 
ing to match the needls for forest watershed management and sanita- 
tion in the Canal Zone, considerable reliance on existing U.S. 
services will be necessary.49 The Commission must also t a k e  ac- 
tive role in monitori~ng these problems and making recommenda- 
tions. It can do this by broadly interpreting its mandate to 
"periodically review tlhe implementation of the treaties" and to "rec- 
ommend as appropriate to the two governments" ways to avoid or 
mitigate adverse environmental  impact^.^" In addition to this right 
to recommend, the Commission enjoys the right to receive "complete 
47 Farmers have cleared forest from about half of the watershed, and operation of the 
Canal is threatened by destabilization of water flows and by desedimentation of the lake and 
its reservoirs. 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, mpra note 8, at 16569, 550-54, 613 (1977). Loss of 
forest will also deny scientists a wide range of flora and fauna for study. 
Slash-and-bum practices are fast encroaching upon the Canal; as much as 80 percent of 
the Gatun Lake watenhed and 40 percent of the Madden Lake watershed have been defor- 
ested since 1952. Letter from Scientific Committee Chairman of the Panama Audubon Soci- 
ety to U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 26, 1977), r'prh&d in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT S'TATEMEKT FOR THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES P-29 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as F;EIS]. 
48 The health personnel of the Canal Zone constitute what the Gorgas Memorial Insti- 
tute of Tropical and Preventative Medicine tenns "an epidemiological early disease warning 
system," alerting states from Venezuela and Colombia to Mexico and the United States of 
dangers of spreading diseases. Yellow fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, vesicular stoma- 
titis of cattle, malaria, Icishm.aniasis, and even hybrid "kiuer bees" are a few of the possible 
diseases and pests which coulcl migrate through the region if adequate preventative measutw 
are not taken. Id 
49 The U.S. Agency for I[nternational Development (AID) approved a $10 million loan 
in 1978 for a watershed management project, which would develop the Panamanian agencies' 
capacity to manage and protect the fotwts of the region. Id at 40. No comparable measutw 
have been taken in the area of health and sanitation. Id at 42. 
50 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 27, art. VI, para. 2. 
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information on any action taken in accordance with this treaty" 
when both nations judge that such action may have "significant ef- 
fect on the en~ironment."~' 
The Commission faces additional organizational problems if it 
accepts this pervasive role. First, a system of consultation among 
neighboring states must be set up. This system of consultation could 
be accomplished by a concerted act of the Joint Commission, the 
United States, and Panama. The U.S.-Canadian I.J.C. or the U.S.- 
Mexican International Boundary and Water Commission, discussed 
supra, could serve as useful models.52 
Second, the Commission needs an adequate professional support 
staff to monitor, study, and receive information on Canal problems. 
The Commission working alone cannot effectively achieve its goals, 
as former Acting Secretary of State Christopher pointed out in his 
policy statement of 1978.53 An earlier environmental impact state- 
ment recognized this need, and observed that the "detailed responsi- 
bilities, staffing and operating procedures of the Commission will 
have to be worked out within the U.S. government and with the 
Panamanians . . . . ,954 
Beyond this preliminary structure the Commission confronts the 
practical problem of organizing its work. Two items of utmost im- 
portance for the Commission's agenda have been discussed above. 
Beyond these, the Treaty provides the Commission the opportunity 
to address: (1) recommendations for Panama as it develops its next 
five-year Development Plan; (2) the preservation of rare and endan- 
gered species in the tropical forests the Canal Zone; (3) the environ- 
mental consequences of the proposed "sea-level" canal, and 
(4) expansion of the laws of Panama to encompass environmental 
issues beyond the 
If the Joint Commission on the Environment functions profes- 
sionally and efficiently, it will gain the confidence of those through- 
out the region who depend on the Panamanian environment. New 
functions may then be added, as happened with the Canadian and 
Mexican Commissions. A system for peaceful settlement of environ- 
mental disputes should be considered. Panama and the U.S. antici- 
51 Jd at art. VI ,  para. 3. 
52 Note, Jntmmliional Joint Commhcsion, mpa note 41, at 500, 518. 
53 Statement of Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher, rtp"n&din Robinson, An 
Enuironmenta~ut h h  at the hnam ~ h a l  Trtatiecs, SIERRA CLUB BULL., April 1978, at 24 
(pledging that the Commission will have the staff and financial support it needs to be effec- 
tive). 
54 FEIS, supra note 47, at 18. 
55 Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 27, art. XII, para. I. 
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pate the need for the new mechanisms between themselves in the text 
of the Treaty.56 Since Canal-related actions can easily affect the en- , 
vironment of neighboring states, a broader dispute settlement system 
would be a prudent ;addition. 
The undertaking Iby the United States and Panama to implement 
the Treaty in a manner consistent with the protection of the environ- 
ment contributes importantly to international law. It reflects the 
duty framed in Principle 22 of the United Nations Stockholm Decla- 
ration on the Human Environment that all nations shall cooperate to 
assure environmentall pr~tection.~' It also goes far toward imple- 
menting Principle 21 of the Declaration that each nation must pre- 
vent actions within its jurisdiction or control from causing envi- 
ronmental harm to areas outside its control.58 
In terms of U.S. law, the Joint Environment Commission is a con- 
crete response by the State Department to its NEPA obligation that 
it cooperate for envil-onmental protection in the international con- 
text.59 Thus, creation of the Joint Environment Commission re- 
sponds to both international and national law environmental 
protection mandates. If there is a flaw in the conception of the Joint 
Commission, it is not in its creation or structure; rather it is in the 
lack of attention given it by both countries. Direct Congressional 
responsibility could remedy this situation. An environmental catas- 
trophe arising from deforestation or disease would focus worldwide 
attention on the Commission's implementation problems, but this 
would bring change only at the cost of major environmental damage, 
expensive remedial measures, and breaches of international obliga- 
tions. We can hope that the U.S. and Panamanian governments will 
not wait for such a catastrophe to commence proper support for their 
Commission. 
The administratioln of President Ronald Reagan has indicated a 
businesslike approach toward the Panama Canal Treaty. While 
commitments will be honored, the priorities probably will not in- 
clude an expansive reading of the environmental protection roles 
possible for the Joint Environment Commission. One environmental 
issue, a sea-level canal, has been rendered less likely to emerge, be- 
cause a 78-mile oil pipeline is being planned for construction be- 
tween Charco Azul B;ay on the Pacific and Chiriqui Grande on the 
56 Id at art. XIV. 
57 For text with annotations, see Sohn, mpra note 6. 
58 Id at 485. 
59 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2)(Q (1976). 
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Atlanti~.~" The pipeline will be used for shipment of oil from tankers 
bearing Alaskan oil, thereby obviating the need to enlarge the Pan- 
ama Canal to accommodate supertankers. Because the Republic of 
Panama is reported to be contracting directly with U.S. and interna- 
tional corporate entities, it seems unlikely that the environmental 
protection role of the Joint Environment Commission will be in- 
volved. Nonetheless, if needed, the mechanism of the Commission is 
available. 
IV. UNEP3s ROLE IN WARNING OF MAJOR 
INTERNATIONAL HAZARDS 
Just as the Panama-U.S. Joint Commission facilitates transna- 
tional cooperation to cope with regional environmental problems, 
the U.N. Environment Programme has the potential to focus trans- 
national cooperation on shared global problems. Under the Stock- 
holm Declaration, each nation is responsible for ensuring that 
activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of areas beyond the limits of its national juri~diction.~' 
There is, however, no internationally accepted method of implement- 
ing this principle. The result is that states take actions largely with- 
out regard for their environmental impact on other nations or on the 
shared commons such as the oceans or atmosphere. 
Existing political structures have authority to call for interna- 
tional action to cope with global hazards. As with the implementa- 
tion of the Panama-U.S. Commission, the question is how to build 
the means to take this action. 
There are several issues which must be addressed in fashioning an 
institution for transnational action. This essay is necessarily prelimi- 
nary regarding both regional and global measures for environmental 
protection; these issues require further study and refinement. None- 
theless, just as there is a role for Joint Commissions on the environ- 
ment, there should be a comparable role for a global authority such 
as UNEP. This can be most clearly illustrated in the case of major 
international "hazard alerts." 
At the outset, a working definition is needed for "major interna- 
tional hazard." To be "major", the environmental injury should be 
60 Pace, Panamo Oil &klk Job l Ass~+Iahho Cotifroctor Wins 7% &&r, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 19, 1981, at D5, col. 1. 
61 & notes 57-58 +nd accompanying text -0. 
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substantial, affecting the life-support system immediately or in the 
foreseeable future. This impact may be (i) global, such as 
threatened ozone depletion or climate modification; (ii) regional, 
having a more limited geographic effect, such as transnational acid 
rain or pollution of an international river; or (iii) species or resource 
specific, such as extinction of an endangered species or depletion. of 
an essential local resource. 
This essay notes the third category in passing only. Endangered 
species are protected by the Endangered Species C ~ n v e n t i o n . ~ ~  Al- 
though the species may be found solely within one state's boundaries, 
the international community has imposed a high standard of care on 
such a state in recognition of the common interest in the resource. 
As for resource specific hazards other than those in the endan- 
gered category, no mec:hanisms exist for protection of resources lo- 
cated wholly within one state. A careless or wasteful state could 
destroy its resources anld consign its future generations to poverty. 
While such conduct might offend the environmental sensibilities of 
other states, at present this dimension of state conduct is not subject 
to international constraints unless the activity bears an impact upon 
other nations or a commons area. For such dangers, transnational 
cooperation such as that of the Barcelona Agreement or Panama Ca- 
nal Treaty is required. 
The most numerous major international hazards are regional. 
Cloud seeding to abate hail or defuse a hurricane by one state may 
deprive another state of rain needed for irrigation. High stacks to 
dissipate air pollution i.n one state may cause acid rains in another. 
Discharges of industrial wastes into one state's river water may con- 
taminate waters downstream in another country. Siting of a nuclear 
facility on a bay shared by two states may inflict thermal discharges 
and risks of a nuclear accident on the neighbor. Similar examples 
abound. Since each instance is fact-specific, each probably requires a 
specially tailored strate:gy to cope with the hazard. But some ac- 
cepted mechanism or p~~ocedure for instituting protection measures is 
required. . 
A R C ~ Z O M ~  C i  Stelv-Nzgerian ozf dedoopmcnt. Consider the un- 
regulated off-shore oil development along the Nigerian coast. As a 
developing country, Nigeria is eager to exploit its oil resources, but 
does not enforce pollution controls. The result is oil pollution in the 
nearby Bight of Benin and the coastlines of neighboring states. 
62 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
March 3, 1973, - U.N.T.S. -, rcpnnkdin 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085 (1973) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Endangered Spccici Convention]. 
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Three responses are possible to such a regional pollution hazard. 
First, the stringent anti-pollution safeguards employed off the Cali- 
fornia and North Sea coasts could be required in Nigeria. This re- 
quires either that the Nigerian government have the expertise and 
power to implement such procedures, or that aggrieved parties have 
access to reliable information when they seek injunctive relief in 
This approach also assumes that the Nigerian courts and 
government will value the quality of the environment over rapid oil 
production. 
A second response focuses on the companies producing the oil. 
These multinational enterprises derive their expertise and capital 
from North America and Europe. If the states which incorporate, 
audit, and otherwise regulate such companies also insist upon their 
environmental responsibility abroad, then the securities laws, the 
monitoring of export permits, and other regulatory controls should 
be structured to promote, if not require, a high standard of care.64 
A third response looks to multilateral measures. A "Barcelona 
ConventionH-type mechanism might be developed among the several 
coastal states.65 This regional agreement would provide for con- 
certed efforts to identify the pollution hazards, agree on their abate- 
ment, and assist in the implementation and monitoring of remedial 
measures. 
Of these alternatives, only the third is apt to produce a satisfac- 
tory response. As long as Nigeria is producing and exporting oil, it 
has no economic interest in curbing production to protect the re- 
gional environment. The states within the Nigerian Federation 
where the enterprises extracting oil are located are not likely to assert 
independent local authority. If the oil company is incorporated 
abroad, the state of incorporation is not likely to regulate either ac- 
tivity abroad or the activity of a foreign subsidiary which fails to use 
the most stringent oil pollution safeguards. 
A Global Case Stdy. Many regional environmental problems have 
no impact on a larger scale. For instance, the eutrophication and 
63 When fishermen and villagers sued Shell-BP Development Company in Nigerian 
courts over the loss of fresh water resulting from coastal oil development, no one presented 
evidence on possible safeguards against oil pollution, short of terminating oil development, 
that might be ordered under the equity powers of the court. &e Nwogugu, h w  andEnvirn-  
IWU k fhe Ntsrn'an Oil  fry, I EARTH L.J. 91, 98-100 (1975). 
64 Be Robinson, E n u i r ~ ~ n m t a /  h w s  and Conucnlom: T i d  Skieta/ Compncis Wi th  Nature, 
in EARTHCARE, * a  note 20, at 513, 529-31 (1978). 
65 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 
1976, - U.N.T.S. -, rcpnnfcdin 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 290 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Barcelona Convention]. 
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other environmental problems in Lake Kariba in Africa can be han- 
dled as regional issues alone.66. But where accumulated local acts 
have a gradual global impact, the hazard becomes one of global con- 
cern. 
Specific projects within one country can also have global conse- 
quences. Thus, a salt-water sea-level canal in Panama mixing the 
Pacific and Atlantic lOceans might alter these commons and ad- 
versely affect the ecosystems of the Caribbean.67 
Finally, there are global hazards which patterns of trade or tech- 
nology force upon many individual countries. The combined effect 
and the recurring and pervasive nature of such hazards render them 
suitable for international treatment. 
The endangerment: of the earth's ozone layer provides an exam- 
ple. The impact of fluorocarbons on the ozone layer was suggested in 
1974 by two American,  scientist^.^^ Public attention focused on aero- 
sol sprays as a source of fluorocarbons, although other sources existed 
as well. 
Authority for the regulation of fluorocarbon emissions, like most 
pollutants, rests at the municipal, or domestic, level. Demand for 
action on aerosol sprays surmounted the facts, and the sprays were 
banned in the United. States. The fact that no single and central 
forum existed for international deliberations on the ozone threat has 
resulted in a pattern of inconsistent national legislation. While the 
United States banned fluorocarbon aerosols, many European nations 
did ,not. Such bans, therefore, while costly, may be ineffective. 
T o  avert such prc~blems, an international agency is needed to 
identify global hazards, propose reasoned responses, and develop the 
consensus in favor of i i  given course of action. This would result in 
new international env:ironmental law. 
B. Elements of an lnstliutional Role fir Coping with Global and Regional 
Hatardr 
There are at least four principal functions which an institution 
must perform in order to cope with such international environmental 
hazards. 
66 &e M. FARVAR & J. MILTON, THE CARELESS TECHNOLOGY 206-35 (1972). This 
work also contains other case studies of primarily local concerns. 
67 A feasibility study of ;a sea-level canal is provided for in the Panama Canal Treaty, 
along with measures to promote environmental protection. Panama Canal Treaty, mpo note 
27, arts. VI, XII. 
G8 Rowland & Molina, C h / m / r k m o r n e ~ c . r  in I/rc Envrionmcnf, REVS. GEOPHYSICS &
SPACE PHYSICS, Feb. 1975, at 1, 13. 
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1. The institution must have scientific competence, using the 
existing scientific community rather than duplicating its 
efforts. It is important that scientists control data collec- 
tion and define as fully as possible the nature of interna- 
tional environmental hazards. 
The goal here is an independent and valid scientific inquiry into 
hazards and related situations. An international body could choose 
the topics for which it would fund data collection and research; it 
should also be ready to fund investigations which scientific unions 
identify. 
2. The institution must have some means to gauge the risk 
which the data reveal. This is a difficult task, and several 
tools may be appropriate depending on the nature of the 
hazard. 
The findings of the scientific community must be ranked on the 
institution's agenda. Risk cannot be weighed unless the social, envi- 
ronmental, economic, and other externalities are given values and 
entered into the equation. An interdisciplinary panel of experts 
could perform this task; to maximize its objectivity the panel would 
examine all identifiable social and economic concerns related to a 
hazard, then classify it as major or insignificant. 
3. The institution must have means to respond to the hazard 
proportionate to its risk. 
Many tools are available in dealing with a hazard, such as invit- 
ing consultations, initiating treaty conferences, and calling for medi- 
ation. The Barcelona Agreement contains many useful examples of 
such institutional measures: Beyond "general undertakings" to avert 
pollution, its protocols also specify the mechanics of environmental 
protection, such as emergency measures to deal with oil spills and 
other disasters, and harmonization of domestic laws to abate land- 
based pollution.69 
One important tool could be issuance of an environmental 
"alert" for especially serious hazards. Communication of a problem, 
in forms appropriate to the circumstances, can be a critical first step 
in resolving the problem. Such communications, however, may fall 
on unresponsive ears; these alerts, therefore, should be viewed as only 
a part of a broader plan. 
Such alerts may be likened to the environmental impact state- 
69 Barcelona Convention, supra note 65, art. 8; Protocol Concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in 
Casea of Emergency, Feb. 16, 1976, - U.N.T.S. ,rcpnj~lcdin 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 
306. 
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ments now required by several nations.70 The scientists defining the 
problem and the interdisciplinary experts estimating its impact and 
costs would prepare tlhe best possible statement on the hazard and its 
environmental and other consequences. Having openly been con- 
fronted with the risk, the responsible party could examine the evalua- 
tions and either act, imodify its actions, or decline to act. 
Where the respon:sible party is not likely to act voluntarily, some 
incentive is needed. The international institution should consider 
how to create that incentive as a part of its planning function. 
4. Finally, the institution must have oversight, monitoring, 
auditing, and follow-up capabilities. 
Such activity identifies and permits adjustments in remedial pro- 
grams, as well as promoting implementation of, and compliance 
with, such programs. 
c. Legal Authon@ for Developing /nstitutions to Cope with Mafor 
International Hazardr 
Even a survey of global and regional environmental hazards as 
cursory as the foregoing demonstrates that no one institution or legal 
mechanism is likely to suit every situation. A variety of institutions 
with different competcences is probably needed to.accommodate both : 
environmental and political realities. 
1. UNEP as an hrtmtional Coordinating Authort'ly . 
Some international authority competent to perform a coordinat- 
ing and overview function should exist to identify hazards and to 
involve states or relevant regional and international organizations in 
fashioning means to control the hazards. It is logical that the United 
Nations Environment Programme perform such a role. It has facili- 
tated the cooperation of states in fashioning solutions to environmen- 
tal problems, such a s  the Barcelona Agreement for combatting 
pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, discussed mpra .71 
Although strictly speaking UNEP is not mandated to develop in- 
ternational environmental law, its Governing Council acknowledges 
that "it can facilitate t:his development by initiating appropriate con- 
sultations between experts"; UNEP has convened legal experts to dis- 
70 The model for such laws has been the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
g4321-4361 (1976). Some 25 states within the United States have enacted comparable 
laws, as have several Australian states, France, and a few other countries; similar proposals 
are under consideration elsewhere. Jie, eg., Yamamura, Itocec/ura/ Aspcct~ of Enuimnmen&/ Im-  
pocl Am/ysrj i n J a p ~ . .  A Aoposalof Lpf Polity, 2 EARTH L.J. 255 (1976). 
71 Barcelona  convention^, supra note 65. 
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cuss the legal principles appropriate for governing resources shared 
by more than one state and similar issues.72 In fact, because UNEP is 
not a law-making body, its scientific and technical roles have an in- 
tegrity and legitimacy uncompromised by the different attributes of a 
policy-making or political body. Although early concern of states 
like Brazil and Argentina that UNEP might intrude in domestic af- 
fairs has greatly dissipated, some otherwise sympathetic observers 
have expressed skepticism that UNEP can work as effectively as nec- 
essary with countries and international agencies to fashion new insti- 
tutions for environmental p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~  
In view of UNEP's consulting and coordinating roles, it seems 
both appropriate and desirable that UNEP should establish some 
program to identify international environmental hazards, to issue 
warnings about them, and to provide a forum for and facilitation of 
consultations. 
2. Tools for Instituting Environmental Proteclion Mechanisms. 
At this point, it may be useful to sketch some of the tools avail- 
able to UNEP for fashioning institutions and systems to cope with 
environmental hazards. These can be municipal, bilateral, regional, 
or multilateral. 
For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) has au- 
thority to adopt conventions to cope with pollution;74 more vigorous 
use of the WHO'S constitutional mechanism to cope with air pollu- 
t i ~ n  is possible. The International Labour Organization has compa- 
rable ~apaci ty , '~  as have several other specialized agencies. UNEP 
could encourage these multilateral agencies to develop programs 
more effective in averting major international environmental 
hazards. 
Similarly, UNEP could fashion proposals using the existing insti- 
tutional means under the United Nations Charter for peaceful reso- 
lution of international disputes, such as investigation and fact 
72 Report of Governing Council of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2 
U.N. Environment Programme 174, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GG/26 (1974). 
73 The early Argentine and Brazilian views are set forth succinctly in Bacon, The Ro/c of 
1/16 United Natiom Environment P)opammc (L/NEP) in the &wlopmcnf of / n t ~ ~ ~ I i o n a /  Emiromnrnfa/ 
Low, 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 255, 256-260 (1974). 
74 Constitution of the World Health Organization, opmcdfm s~;eUrfrwr July 22, 1946, arts. 
19 & 21, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185; Shubber, The Ro& of WHO in  
Enuironmmfa/ Po//ution Control, 2 EARTH L.J. 363, 369- 70 (1 976). 
75 &c Bolin, The f n ~ m f i o ~ I  Lubour 0 f i c  and f h  Wmking Enuironmenf , 2 EARTH L.J. 7 
(1976). 
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finding, proposals for regional agencies or  arrangement^,?^ and refer- 
ral to the General As,sembly or Security C ~ u n c i l . ~ ~  Multilateral aid 
programs could also be of assistance. Since many pollution abate- 
ment programs are cc~stly and require expertise not always available, 
UNEP could cooperate with aid agencies to identify ways to use 
financial and technical assistance to promote pollution control. 
Where a new activity having transnational impact is proposed by 
one state, UNEP could promote the organization of joint ventures or 
multilateral agreemerits among the interested states in order to insti- 
tutionalize the activity and thus control its adverse transnational en- 
vironmental effects. Such a mechanism could anticipate and abate 
any hazards from a new project. 
Either technical arnd financial aid or new institutional relation- 
ships could be used to accommodate the varying perspectives of risk 
or hazard which different countries have toward the same activity. 
New procedures are needed to bring all affected states into a working 
relationship to avert the environmental problems which large scale 
activities could produce. 
Panama's new bi1;ateral Joint Environment Commission with the 
United States is a finit step toward such a new institution.?' As dis- 
cussed above, the Connmission has the potential toeimplement protec- 
tive measures for Panama's environment as the United States 
withdraws from the Canal Zone. However, the Joint Commission is 
defective at present because it does not involve the neighboring states 
which also could be affected by a range of activity in Panama far less 
massive than a sea-level canal. 
The Endangered Species Convention illustrates an alternative in- 
stitutional f rame~ork. '~  By international agreement, the participat- 
ing states designate a Management Authority and a Scientific 
Authority to implement the treaty. A Secretariat is designated to 
oversee the operation of the treaty. Export and import permits are 
required by domestic law, and reporting and documentation are re- 
quired; biannual conferences and dispute settlement articles are pro- 
76 U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 52(2)-(3) (dealing with resort to regional agencies and local 
disputes respectively). 
77 &G S. BAILEY, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES: IDEAS AND PROPOSALS FOR 
RESEARCH 17-18 (rev. ed. 1!371) (UNITAR study). 
78 The Commission is created in Article VI of the Canal Treaty, supra note 28. Com- 
pare the U.S.-Panama Environment Commission with the US.-Canadian International Joint 
Commission, as an on-going means for control of transfrontier environmental problems. A 
description of the U.S.-Canatdian commission appears in Note, f ~ ~ m r a l i 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ f  Commi~~ion, 
supra note 41. 
79 Endangered Species Convention, supra note 62. 
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vided. Such a pattern coordinates municipal authorities, as does the 
Barcelona Agreement. 
Any new institutional arrangement would offer a better opportu- 
nity for avoiding major environmental hazards than would resort to 
traditional adjudications. Arbitration is probably useful only in con- 
texts where cause and effect from one state to another can be demon- 
strated clearly. Resort to the International Court of Justice seems 
unlikely unless the two states both accept the Court's jurisdiction. 
The failure of France to accede to adjudication of the claims of Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand concerning radioactive pollution from 
French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific illustrates how 
the political context may eliminate the possibility of a judicial deter- 
minati~n.~'  
An international forum is also not likely to be used to adjudicate 
environmental rights and liabilities because the scientific nature of 
these problems is too little understood. Especially in the case of a 
major hazard, there is no evidence which can prove causation; 
rather, only general trends can be identified. Caution is needed in 
assigning liability. New institutional mechanisms can be tailored to 
explore such trends better than can adjudications. 
This is not to say that a new environmental institution could not 
create a new adjudicatory mechanism. States with a shared resource 
might institute a common permit system for the use of the resource, 
and then agree to allow appeals to an international tribunal to assure 
uniformity in the administration of the permit system among the sev- 
eral jurisdictions. This system of environmental tribunals has been 
initiated within some states in the US.*' and certainly could be re- 
peated among nations. 
3. Resolution in the Absence ofAn International Regime. 
Without an international institution or forum through which to 
resolve disputes about environmental hazards, the resolution of such 
disputes falls either to general state practice or to municipal adminis- 
trative and judicial mechanisms. 
Statepractice. State practice will probably amount to a laissez-faire 
attitude in which environmental issues are disregarded until the 
political costs of doing so become too high. By that time, the number 
80 Judgment in Nuclear Test Cases, Australia v. France, [1974] I.C.J. 253; New Zealand 
v. France, [1974] I.C.J. 457. 
81 &, e.g., Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Board Act, N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW 
55 24- 1 10 1 to 24- 1 105 (McKinney Supp. 1980). On the international plane, see essays by 
Jessup, [I9711 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 261; Lachs, [I9741 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 328. 
Heinonline - -  17 Stan. J. Int'l L. 252 1981 
of available alternatives to avert environmental injury may have 
shrunk or been foreclosed while the costs ,of remedying the harm 
probably will have escalated. Most global and regional major envi- 
ronmental hazards currently rest in this posture. While there have 
been occasional catastl-ophies within countries, such as the toxic fume 
pollution which devastated Seveso, Italy, or the killer smog which hit 
fortuitously no transnational environmental hazards have 
caused major injury. 
Munzct;baf Action. Most activity aimed at resolving international 
environmental hazards to date has occurred at the municipal level. 
The availability of private remedies for transfrontier pollution and 
other environmental irkjury has been extensively studied.83 While lit- 
igation has not been frequent, there are enough reported cases to en- 
courage both scholiarly examination and intergovernmental 
cooperation. In the latter category are the recommendations on 
transfrontier pollution and, more recently, on a regime of equal right 
of access and non-discrimination in relation to transfrontier pollu- 
tion, adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) .84 
While an extended1 discussion of private remedies is beyond the 
scope of this introductory essay, several points relevant to major envi- 
ronmental hazards may be made. In this connection, two aspects of 
municipal law should be considered: procedural law and substantive 
law. 
There are major differences in both of these aspects of law from 
country to country. Consider a comparison of the U.S. and Canada. 
If a nuclear power plant in the state of Washington were to suffer an 
accident in which the reactor vessel was breached and radioactive 
contamination reacheti British Columbia, Canadians could sue for 
damages in the U.S. courts. They would face the limit of liability 
imposed by the American Price-Anderson Act, the validity of which 
the U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld.85 Thus, their procedural 
82 For a discussion of the Seveso tragedy, see 10 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 1193 (1976). 
London suffered 3,500-4,000 smog-related deaths in four days in 1952. &c WHO, HEALTH 
HAZARDS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 24-25 (1972). 
83 See, e.g., McCaffrey, If.iwfc R d r s  fm Tramyionfin Po//ufion /yuncs in ENVIRONMEN- 
TAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECI' (J. Nowak ed. 1976). 
84 OECD, Rccommcndnfion of lhc CounciI on Equal Rtghf of Acccss in RcCation fo Tranryionti' 
Po/lulion, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 19 (1977); Rrcommmdnfion of 1/16 
Councilfir fhr /mplnncnfat~on of w Rrgtmc of E q d  R ~ g h t  o/Acccss and N o n - D u m i n i ~ l i o n  in Rrhiion 
to Transfionfin Po//ution, id at :29. 
85 42 U.S.C. $2210(e) (1976); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina -~nvironmental Study 
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
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right exists but their recovery is circumscribed by substantive law. 
Moreover, if the Canadian plaintiffs tried to sue officials of the Nu- 
clear Regulatory Commission for failing to assure safety measures, 
they would find that the Federal Torts Act does not apply to claims 
arising in a foreign country.86 
If the facts were reversed, U.S. plaintiffs procedurally might not 
even get far enough in the Canadian court to lose on substantive 
grounds. Canadian courts follow a rule honored in most Common- 
wealth countries that courts may not hear an action for damages in- 
volving trespass to a foreign land.87 
Once the private party was properly before a municipal court, 
the rule usually applied in civil law and common law jurisdictions is 
that the law of the place of the wrong governs liability and other 
substantive law matters.88 The ability to bring suit also depends on 
establishing the court's jurisdiction over the offending party. The in- 
jured party in one state may have to enter into a potentially hostile 
forum in another state if the offending party is only to be found 
there. 
In matters of securing protective action before the occurrence of 
injury, similar problems exist. To enjoin hazardous activity by one 
state, it is necessary to sue in its courts since a foreign state's orders to 
halt an on-going activity would not be enforceable except where the 
laws of the offending state permit it. 
Some countries have begun to eliminate this sort of patchwork 
quilt of inconsistent laws. The Nordic Environmental Convention 
gives all citizens of each country party to the treaty an equal right to 
invoke judicial or administrative measures to secure environmental 
relief." 
Finally, lacking a way to protect legitimate private interests, pri- 
vate persons may seek state action. Canada's Arctic Waters Pollu- 
tion Prevention Act, adopted in 1970, changed patterns of 
international law by establishing a pollution zone to protect its arctic 
ecosy~tems.~~ This avenue may be useful for coastal states, but has 
limited utility for shared resources or transfrontier pollution. 
The OECD's proposals for equal rights of access and nondiscrimi- 
86 Federal Tort Claims Act, 5 421(k), 28 U.S.C. § 2 6 8 0 0  (1976). 
a7 British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique, [I8931 A.C. 602. 
88 For a discussion of this principle, known as /ex /ocide~icficmmissi, see 2 E.  RABEL, THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 235 (2d ed. Drobnig 1960). 
89 Nordic Environmental Convention, Feb. 19, 1974, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 4 IN- 
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: MULTILATERAL TREATIES 974 (W. Burhenne ed. 
1974) (Fund for Environmental Studics (FUST) Project No. 51). 
90 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 2, (1st Supp. 1970). 
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nation are similar initiatives to assure availability of municipal fo- 
rums for relief, but the OECD recommendations are not binding. 
They contain principles for state conduct regarding transfrontier pol- 
lution and also advancle principles for the legal protection of persons 
from transfrontier p o l l ~ t i o n . ~ ~  The OECD proposals are intended to 
ensure that relief for pollution from outside a jurisdiction is as effec- 
tive as for pollution wholly within the jurisdiction. Procedurally, an 
injured party is to be given full access to all municipal mechanisms 
available to abate pollution, regardless of where the party comes 
from. This OECD prolposal has been criticized as benefiting the pol- 
luter too much. As Ernst Willheim puts it: 
From the perspective of his foreign victim the scenario is 
somewhat different [than that of the defendant polluter where 
the suit is brought under the OECD proposal]. The ordinary 
victim of transfrointier pollution damage is likely to be 
shocked and dismaryed when his legal advisers inform him 
that to recover cornpensation he must litigate in a foreign 
state. . . . The avziilability of 'equal right of access' will be 
but small consolation when he is faced with the daunting 
prospect of litigation in a place that is geographically remote, 
probably conducted in a foreign language, according to for- 
eign procedures, and almost certainly according to a foreign 
legal system..92 
The involuntary victim of foreign pollution might be comfortable su- 
ing in the foreign couri: if the jurisdictions are similar, as among the 
Nordic states, but othelwise Willheim's criticisms illustrate the short- 
comings of equal access to the municipal forum. 
Several possible municipal legal consequences may flow from a 
decision by a cornpeterit international authority to identify a major 
environmental hazard. While these may present obstacles to such a 
system, alone they probably are not of sufficient moment to prevent 
creation of an international "alert" mechanism or the development 
of other institutions. 
Municipal law reactions to environmental hazards, such as the 
threat posed by fluorocarbons to the ozone layer or the manufacture 
of DDT for export, reveal that individual governments respond am- 
bivalently. This ambivalence is caused not only by the lack of scien- 
91 &e i;.cgcncralb OECD, PROBLEMS IN TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1974). 
92 Willheim, Private Remedies for Transfrontier Environmental Damage: A Critique of 
OECD's Doctrine of Equal Right of Access (manuscript submitted to the Eord Luy f o u m l ) .  
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tific consensus on the problem, but also by political constraints on a 
government's choice of acceptable risks. The implicit understanding 
is that each country must make its own assessment of risk for its citi- 
zens. 
In environmental protection, such inconclusive government con- 
duct results in ineffective safeguards. Different states, and different 
agencies within the states, perceive risks differently. What is lacking 
at the municipal level is a mechanism for resolving the question of 
acceptable risk on a transnational scale. For example, before the 
Barcelona Agreement, each coastal Mediterranean state perceived 
the pollution of the sea as a modest risk; only when UNEP provided 
a means to view the problem as a common one was the risk perceived 
in its true proportions. The problem here is one of externalities, and 
municipal law, with its focus on the individual state, cannot provide 
protection for a global environment. 
If an international authority were to issue an alert on discovery of 
a suspected carcinogen, such as identification of a transnational con- 
taminant in a shared drinking water supply, the scieiitific data to 
prove the cancer-agent correlation would probably be incomplete. 
Most likely those whose interests are tied to the production or use of 
the cancer-causing agent would contest the alert. Meanwhile, those 
exposed to the carcinogen may divide over whether or not they wish 
to assume the risk. Even if one state responds to an alert, vested in- 
terests may evade any sanctions by seeking refuge in other states that 
view the risk as less extreme. Thus, those manufacturing or trading 
in a new suspected carcinogen might respond to an international 
alert by simply relocating to a state not regulating the substance. 
Equally troublesome are the consequences of promoting an alter- 
native to the banned substance, which itself is discovered also to be 
dangerous. The use of phosphates in detergents has been banned in 
several jurisdictions of the United States because of the pollution of 
lakes and supplies of fresh water. Initially it was thought that so- 
dium nitrilotriacetate (NTA) was an effective, yet safe substitute for 
phophates in detergents. Once it was determined that NTA might 
cause cancer, those jurisdictions which had approved NTA found 
that they had to revamp their rules again.93 Had persons relied upon 
official government assurances that NTA was safe, used NTA deter- 
gent and then contracted cancer, a damage action might lie against 
the government, where it has consented to being sued, as has the 
93 E. ASHBY, mpra note 3, at 37. 
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United States through the Federal Tort Claims Act.94 
Should UNEP or any other international organization become 
involved in an envira~nmental protection situation comparable to 
these examples, it would probably encounter the same sort of 
problems. If an alert is issued to an international hazard and the 
steps to abate it neces:jarily impair the financial interests of private 
companies, they are likely to seek ways to protect themselves. It is 
conceivable that they may ask their home government to make a 
claim against UNEP or another state if they believe UNEP has acted 
in violation of some aspect of international law. The usual route for 
private claims against states or multilateral agencies is for a state to 
make the claim for darnages or reparations on behalf of its nationals. 
The same claim could,, of course, be made by a state on its own be- 
half. 
Short of a formal claim following a UNEP alert which injures a 
state's citizens, injured parties might follow two courses. They could 
seek action by a member state of UNEP's Governing Council to cur- 
tail or modify UNEP's; action or, ultimately, a state could refuse to 
fund the action or could deny UNEP access to its territory and assist- 
ance. 
Alternatively, an injured private party might pursue litigation in 
municipal courts for damages. Injured persons could not succeed in 
maintaining a suit agai~nst UNEP itself. International organizations, 
including those with competence in an environmental protection 
field, are immune from the jurisdiction of member states so long as 
they are within the exercise of their assigned functions.95 Thus, the 
employees and other a,gents of a body like UNEP are immune from 
suit when they work on a UNEP project to identify and resolve an 
international environn~ental hazard; they might also be immune 
from subpoena as witnesses concerning their official conduct.96 
It is, of course, alwa.ys possible that an affected party could start a 
suit against UNEP simply for the political exposure and publicity it 
would generate, even tlnough it probably would be dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction. It is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that an 
injured private party could sue any organization, consultant, firm or 
94 Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (current version codi- 
fied at 28 U.S.C. $5 1291, 1346@)-(c), 1402@), 1504, 2110, 2401@), 2402, 2411@), 2412, 
267 1-2680). 
95 Scr, e.g., International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. 9 288 (1976); Con- 
vention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. 
g6 See, e.g., International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976); see also 
County of Westchester v. Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (New Rochelle City Ct. 
1946). 
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other person who performs services for UNEP. Such potential de- 
fendants may not be entitled to rely on UNEP's immunity. Just the 
expense of litigating the immunity issue, for instance, in a U.S. Dis- 
trict Court, could cost the defendant from $15,000 to $25,000, and 
more if discovery is allowed. 
One further political consequence may assume juridical trap- 
pings. An international agency might express a concern about a po- 
tential major international hazard and certain states could 
misconstrue the agency's purpose or beliefs. If, for instance, Panama 
seriously wanted a larger canal and sought to use a nuclear device in 
its construction, both possibilities provided for in the new U.S.- 
Panama Treaties on the Nicaragua might propose that such 
a new canal would be better located in its jurisdiction, but in any 
event might be opposed to both a new Panama Canal and nuclear 
construction methods. Any intervention by an international environ- 
mental body to oppose either a sea-level canal or use of nuclear de- 
vices, could become allied de facto with a position contrary to 
Panama's wishes. Panama might suspect that Nicaragua had pressed 
its case unfairly; local tensions could be exacerbated. 
This introductory survey of the developments in international en- 
vironmental law discussed in this issue of theJournaC includes a wide 
range of topics. Many more have not even been mentioned, such as 
procedures and safeguards for genetic manipulation or limits on en- 
vironmental warfare. Collateral problems also require scrutiny. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for instance, permits non- 
tariff trade barriers where necessary to protect public health; unless 
this exception is examined, international trade could become increas- 
ingly circumscribed by environmental limitations adopted by one or 
more states. 
Ultimately, environmental catastrophes such as the toxic cloud 
that devastated Seveso, Italy, the photochemical smog poisoning the 
air in Los Angeles, California, or the Minamata poisoning of Japa- 
nese citizens and fish, may become the pattern of the future. Some 
deterioration is likely as the world population increases by 
2,300,000,000 over the next two decades. The cumulative effect of 
many small environmental hazards and abuses will soar as the popu- 
lation grows. Population growth itself may become the most trouble- 
some "major environmental hazard". 
97 Panama Canal Treaty, +a note 27, art. XII. 
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The Global 2000 Report confirmed the cumulative hazard from iso- 
lated environmental .problems in evaluating climatic change as fol- 
l o w ~ : ~ ~  
Furthermore, scientists now know that several human ac- 
tivities have reached a scale that, over periods of several to 
many decades, has the potential to alter the world's climate 
significantly. These anthropogenic influences on global cli- 
mate affect the ozone layer as well as potential land use 
changes, aerosol and particulate generation, and heat releases. 
The import of anthropogenic influences on climate lies not 
in any imminent threat of massive climatic change, but rather 
in the inadequacy of present knowledge, and the inability of 
institutions to make spciety respond effectively if evidence of 
serious consequenlces develops. 
A rigorous program to develop the specific new framework to as- 
sure regional or global environmental protection against major 
hazards is needed. UIYEP has demonstrated a willingness and ability 
to do this in limited fields. UNEP's Governing Board should study 
how to broaden UNIEP's initiatives and create new institutions for 
environmental protection. There are at least two aspects to a UNEP 
role in fashioning institutional responses to cope with global environ- 
mental hazards. Ont: concerns the constraints under which UNEP 
works: UNEP is only a decade old and is still assembling the scien- 
tific, technical, and legal resources and support staff it needs to work 
effectively. It must, therefore, limit the number of issues to which it 
gives priority and concentrate its resources to maximum effect. An- 
other aspect is that LJNEP's Governing Council is not structured to 
create international legal standards or procedures, as are certain 
other specialized age:ncies such as WHO or ILO. Because existing 
institutional competeince for international law-making rests in differ- 
ent agencies, UNEP should seek to advance specific international law 
reforms through the agencies best suited to each problem. UNEP 
should act as a broker in the creation of new mechanisms, such as the 
Barcelona Agreement or Panama-U.S. Joint Environment Commis- 
sion. 
While UNEP may provide the guiding and coordinating force to 
alert nations to environmental hazards, each individual state must 
provide the mechanism for coping with the problem. At this level, 
the Panama-U.S. Joint Commission and its predecessors provide a 
model for incorporating environmental concerns into states' foreign 
policies through bilateral treaties. Other mechanisms are con- 
98 2 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 8, at 269. 
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ceivable, each arising from the particular relationships two or more 
states may have built among themselves over the years. 
The most significant tool which could be promoted at the munici- 
pal level is the environmental impact a s ses~ment .~~  The legal re- 
quirements that a person must study all the possible environmental 
consequences before acting alert him to the often unanticipated ad- 
verse impacts of his action while there is still time for corrections. 
Such reports can be an effective tool of foreign policy and organiza- 
tion.'* Also useful would be a set of uniform environmental laws, 
which could be adopted .separately in each state, establishing a com- 
mon pattern of state practice and regulation. 
The Brandt Commiss2bn &port lo '  and The Global 2000 Report '02 both 
document why the international law developments set forth in this 
symposium are critical. Each of the articles that follow sets forth re- 
cent innovations. in international environmental law. Such innova- 
tions are apt to multiply as environmental problems become better 
understood. By collecting these articles at this time, the editors of the 
StanfoordJournal of International Law provide both a scholarly and a 
valuable public service. 
99 National Environmental Policy Act, 5 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
100 St S. REP. NO. 990, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (proposing U.S. sponsorship of an 
international environmental assessment treaty, including draft text proposed by Sen. Clai- 
borne Pell (R.I.)). 
101 BRANDT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7. 
102 GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 8. 
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